I. INTRODUCTION
Gerrymandering has been around since the term was first coined in 1812 when Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry created a "salamander-like" district to benefit his party, the Anti-Federalists. 3 The term gerrymandering is defined as "[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition's voting strength." 4 During most of the two-hundred-year history of gerrymandering, federal courts steadfastly refused to police partisan gerrymandering because drawing electoral districts was considered the province of the legislative branch under the United States Constitution and, therefore, beyond the reach of the federal courts. 5 Finally, in 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States entered the arena in Davis v. Bandemer, 6 holding that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable. 7 Since that decision, the Supreme Court and the federal courts have grappled with finding a judicially manageable standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims. 8 In 2004, the Supreme Court revisited partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer 9 but could not agree on whether a judicially manageable standard exists to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering or whether the courts should even adjudicate partisan gerrymandering. 10 Although federal courts still entertain partisan gerrymandering claims, no workable judicial standard exists to adjudicate them, complicating successful gerrymandering suits. 5. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (holding that Congress has the "exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House" and that it was "left to that House [to determine] whether States have fulfilled their responsibility"); see also Berman, supra note 3, at 785. Nonetheless, remedies were still available in state courts under state constitutional rights, which tended to provide more specific protections to citizens. See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 645 (2004).
6. 478 U.S. 109 (1986 11 Two of the cases ("Texas Redistricting Cases") raise the issues of partisan gerrymandering, one-person, one-vote, and the constitutionality of mid-decade redistricting. 12 The Texas Redistricting Cases will do little to resolve the conflict of Bandemer and Vieth, but they will provide an opportunity for the Court to define "severe partisan gerrymandering" and limit how partisan a legislature can be.
This comment examines the Supreme Court's treatment of partisan gerrymandering in the past and the important aspects of the Texas Redistricting Cases that distinguishes them from other political gerrymandering cases previously before the Court. Part II provides an overview of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on malapportionment and partisan gerrymandering, specifically emphasizing the twenty years of confusion created by the Court's decisions in Bandemer and Vieth. The Supreme Court entered the congressional and state districting arena just over fifty years ago, first adjudicating malapportionment and then partisan gerrymandering. The Court has struggled in determining whether courts should entertain claims of partisan gerrymandering and how they should adjudicate these claims. Part III examines the redistricting situation in Texas as seen in the Texas legislature and the district courts, and highlights important differences between the Texas cases and prior partisan gerrymandering claims that have appeared before the Supreme Court. Finally, Part IV analyzes two partisan gerrymandering arguments presented by the appellants in the Texas Redistricting Cases and the various policy concerns. The appellants argue (1) that mid-decade redistricting for partisan gain constitutes impermissible partisan gerrymandering, and (2) the use of outdated census figures violates 11 the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Constitution. A Supreme Court ruling on partisan gerrymandering, either for the appellants or for the State of Texas, will determine the future of partisan gerrymandering litigation. If the Court upholds the district court's rulings and legitimizes the actions of the Texas legislature, then the Court essentially will leave the policing of partisan gerrymandering to state legislatures and the electorate. If the Court holds the 2003 Texas congressional map unconstitutional as a partisan gerrymander, then the federal courts will continue their struggle to police the politics of state legislatures in the districting process.
II. THE HISTORY OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING

A. From Malapportionment to Partisan Gerrymandering
For over 174 years the Supreme Court tenaciously refused to adjudicate districting cases involving political gerrymandering and malapportionment. 13 This refusal culminated in 1946 in its decision in Colegrove v. Green, 14 a malapportionment case. The Colegrove plaintiffs sought an injunction against holding congressional elections under an outdated Illinois districting scheme that had not been modified since 1901, thus resulting in immense population inequalities between the districts. 15 Writing for a divided Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter rejected the appellant's argument for judicial intervention because Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution 16 entrusted apportionment matters entirely to Congress. 17 "To sustain this action would cut very deep into the 13. Malapportionment is a cousin of gerrymandering and "involves the creation and preservation of electoral districts of different population sizes, so that the ratio of representatives to voters varies across districts." Berman, supra note 3, at 785 n.20. Gerrymandering deals with districts of roughly equal population sizes. very being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket," wrote Justice Frankfurter. 18 "The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress." 19 Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court reversed course and, in Baker v. Carr, 20 held that malapportionment claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. 21 Justice William Brennan used six indicators to determine whether a claim fell within the political question doctrine and, therefore, could not be adjudicated by the federal courts:
[1] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 22 The presence of any one of these factors would render a case nonjusticiable. Justice Brennan argued that none of these factors were present in the claim before the Court and, therefore, the federal courts were not prevented from adjudicating malapportionment claims. 23 Sims, 27 decided in 1963 and 1964, established the crucial one-person, one-vote rule in malapportionment cases dealing with both state and congressional districts. 28 The Court found the constitutional basis for the one-person, one-vote rule in both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 29 and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. 30 Chief Justice Earl Warren clearly articulated this rule in Reynolds, writing that "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State." 31 The Court first acknowledged the problem of partisan gerrymandering in Reynolds but did not determine the justiciability of a partisan gerrymandering claim because that was not an issue presented before the Court. 32 subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 33 Ten years later in Karcher v. Daggett, 34 another malapportionment case, Justice John Paul Stevens, argued in his concurring opinion, that the Equal Protection Clause also protects against partisan gerrymandering. 35 When a State adopts rules governing its election machinery or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the entire community. If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic or politicalthat may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 36 Justice Lewis Powell, in his dissent, also tackled the issue of gerrymandering and agreed that based upon the facts in Karcher, "one cannot rationally believe that the New Jersey Legislature considered factors other than the most partisan political goals and population equality" and that the plan violated equal protection. 37 Because the district court only considered the constitutionality of the population deviations and did not adjudicate the gerrymandering issue, Justice Powell reasoned that the gerrymandering was not at issue for the Court. 38 B. The Justiciability of Partisan Gerrymandering
Partisan Gerrymandering is Justiciable
It was not until Davis v. Bandemer, 39 sixteen years after Baker decided the justiciability of malapportionment, that the Court, in a six-to-three vote, declared that partisan gerrymandering was a 33. Id. at 578-79. 34. 462 U.S. 725 (1983) . In Karcher, plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey congressional apportionment plan arguing that it allegedly diluted the voting strength of Republicans. See id. at 729. The Court invalidated the scheme because the population deviations between the congressional districts failed to reflect a good-faith effort to achieve population equality after analyzing the case under Article I, Section 2 and prior case law but did not broach the issue of gerrymandering in its decision. 40 Indiana Democrats challenged the redistricting scheme adopted by the Republican-controlled state legislature, claiming that the scheme diluted the votes of that state's Democrats and violated their equal protection rights. 41 Six Justices agreed that partisan gerrymandering was a justiciable issue without deciding upon a standard for adjudicating those claims, reasoning that when Baker decided that malapportionment was a justiciable issue, the Baker Court "did not rely on the potential for such a rule in finding justiciability." 42
The test the four-member plurality of the Bandemer Court set forth required proof of "both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group" for the partisan gerrymandering suit to be successful. 43 The first prong of this test, intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group, would not be difficult for plaintiffs to meet, the Court reasoned, so long as the redistricting plan had been done by the state legislature. 44 To measure the second prong, the requisite discriminatory effect, there would need to be proof that the particular political group had "been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process." 45 This high threshold would be satisfied "by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process." 46 Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, rejected this test and argued that "district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding where those lines will fall, the State should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party affiliation." 47 [T]he Court's holding that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable has opened the door to pervasive and unwarranted judicial superintendence of the legislative task of apportionment. There is simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group.
. . . The Equal Protection Clause does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims, and no group right to an equal share of political power was ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 The Bandemer decision confused federal courts by failing to set forth a clear standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, leaving the federal courts to rely upon the plurality's impossible test. The twenty partisan gerrymandering cases that followed Bandemer resulted in the federal courts denying relief in each and every one, 51 leaving commentators to conclude that its "standards are fundamentally unworkable and incorporate such ambiguous and unclear commands as to be unfit for any manageable form of judicial application. 
No Standard Exists for the Courts to Adjudicate Partisan Gerrymandering
After eighteen years, the Supreme Court returned to confront partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer. 53 The 2000 Census reduced the number of congressional seats in Pennsylvania from twenty-one to nineteen and the state legislature assumed the task of drawing a new districting map. 54 The Republican Party controlled a majority of both state houses and the Governor's office and adopted a partisan redistricting map, known as Act 1, designed to punish Democrats for enacting pro-Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere. 55 The plan was designed to give Republicans at least thirteen congressional seats, even though the political parties shared almost equal support among the Pennsylvania electorate. 56 Registered Democrats in Pennsylvania brought suit against Act 1, seeking to enjoin its implementation and alleging "malapportioned districts, in violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement of Article I, [Section] 2 of the United States Constitution, and that it constituted a political gerrymander, in violation of Article I and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 57 The complaint alleged that districts were drawn in a "meandering and irregular" way and that "all traditional redistricting criteria, including the preservation of local government boundaries," had been ignored for the purpose of partisan advantage. 58 The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss all the claims against Pennsylvania except the apportionment claim, 59 over which the court retained jurisdiction to review and approve the remedial plan, enacted on April 18, 2002, known as Act 34. 60 The plaintiffs moved to impose the remedial districts, arguing that Act 34 should not be considered a proper remedial scheme because it was malapportioned and constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander for the same reasons as Act 1. 61 The district court denied the motion and concluded that the new districts were not malapportioned and did not constitute a partisan gerrymander. 62 The court reasoned that Act 1 simply made it more difficult for the plaintiffs to elect Democratic candidates, and that alone was not enough to prevail: 63 [T]he mere fact that a particular appointment scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm. . . . [A] group's electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 64 The Supreme Court heard the case on December 10, 2003, and in a four-four-one vote, upheld the ruling of the district court. 65 The Supreme Court, as it did in Bandemer, disagreed on how partisan gerrymandering claims should be adjudicated in Vieth. The plurality, written by Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, held that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. 66 Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed that no justiciable standard existed and affirmed the district court's opinion joined in dismissing the claim but would not go so far as to say all partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. 67 Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, David Souter (joined by Ruth Bader Ginsberg), and John Paul Stevens dissented from the plurality, with each dissent proposing a new test for federal courts to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering. 68 The plurality opinion recognized that even though the judiciary is responsible for declaring what the law is, there are cases in which the judiciary "has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness-because the question is entrusted to one of the po-UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1193 litical branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights." 69 Looking back to the six independent tests of Baker v. Carr, Justice Scalia concluded that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because they lack judicially discoverable and manageable standards, one of the factors listed in Baker. 70 Reasoning that because the federal courts had failed to succeed in shaping the standard from Bandemer and because the four dissenters enunciated three different standards, each one different from the two standards proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed by the appellants, Justice Scalia concluded that "there is no constitutionally discernable standard" for partisan gerrymandering cases. 71 In examining the six tests put forth to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice Scalia began with the test proposed by the plurality in Bandemer because it had been the standard used by the federal courts. 72 Justice Scalia rejected this test because it "was misguided when proposed, has not been improved in subsequent application, and is not even defended . . . by the appellants." 73 The appellants proposed a test similar to Bandemer but modified the level of intent to predominant intent. 74 Under this test, "a plaintiff must 'show that the mapmakers acted with a predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage,' [supported] 'by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that other neutral and legitimate redistricting criteria were subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan advantage.'" 75 Justice Scalia discarded this test because the second part of the test would require that a redistricting plan be invalidated only if a majority of the electorate is prevented from electing a majority of the representatives, and this is constitutionally unjustifiable because there is no constitutional requirement of proportional representation. 76 and Justice Scalia argued that because "a person's politics is rarely as readily discernible-and never as permanently discernable-as a person's race," 78 it is impossible to ascertain which party holds the majority in a state. 79 Justice Scalia discarded the three-factor test proposed by Justice Powell in Bandemer 80 because it rests upon the idea of fairness, and "'[f]airness' does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard." 81
The plurality then examined the tests proposed by the dissenters, Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer. Justice Stevens argued that political affiliations are an inappropriate factor to consider when constructing district lines, 82 and that by looking at the appearance of the districts and procedures used to create them, courts can effectively identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. 83 Applying the analysis of racial gerrymandering, Justice Stevens proposed to examine whether partisan considerations dominate over neutral considerations and control the redistricting scheme. 84 If there is no identifiable neutral criterion used that can justify the district lines, and if the only possible explanation for the district's bizarre shape is a desire to increase party strength, there is a valid partisan gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 85 Justice Scalia criticized Justice Stevens's test for the same reasons the appellants' standard failed to pass muster; the criterion used for racial gerrymandering cases cannot be applied to partisan gerrymandering claims. 86 Justice Souter proposed a test that would require plaintiffs "to satisfy elements of a prima facie cause of action, at which point the State would have the opportunity not only to rebut the evidence supporting plaintiff's case, but to offer an affirmative justification for the districting choices, even assuming the proof of the 78. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287 (plurality opinion). 79. See id. at 286-87 (plurality opinion). 80. The three factors, none of which are dispositive, include (1) the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries, (2) the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted, and (3) plaintiff's allegations." 87 The plaintiff would have to establish five required elements: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a "cohesive political group" such as a major political party; 88 (2) the district in which the plaintiff resides "paid little or no heed to those traditional districting principles whose disregard can be shown straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features;" 89 (3) "specific correlations between the district's deviations from traditional districting principles and the distribution of the population of [the plaintiff's] group" are sufficient to support "an inference that the district took the shape it did because of the distribution of plaintiff's group;" 90 (4) presentation of a hypothetical district that includes the plaintiff's residence "in which the proportion of the plaintiff's group was lower (in a packing claim) or higher (in a cracking one) and which at the same time deviated less from traditional districting principles than the actual district;" 91 and (5) Justice Breyer proposed the sixth and final test and was the only dissenter in Vieth to agree that the use of political considerations in redistricting is not a fatal flaw but can actually be a valuable tool in situations such as single-member districts. 96 Justice Breyer argued that a system of redistricting that does not take into account partisan considerations could convert "a small shift in political sentiment . . . into a seismic shift in the make-up of the legislative delegation." 97 [T]raditional or historically based boundaries are not, and should not be, "politics free." Rather, those boundaries represent a series of compromises of principle-among the virtues of, for example, close representation of voter views, ease of identifying "government" and "opposition" parties, and stability in government. They also represent an uneasy truce, sanctioned by tradition, among different parties seeking political advantage. 98 Justice Breyer argued that partisan redistricting is unconstitutional when it involves "unjustified entrenchment." 99 He defined entrenchment as a situation in which "a party that enjoys only minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative power" and unjustified entrenchment as a situation in which "the minority's hold on power is purely the result of partisan manipulation and not other factors." 100 While Justice Breyer failed to give specific examples of unjustified entrenchment, he did illustrate the concept with several sets of circumstances; in each, he evaluated four factors, including (1) when the districts were redrawn, (2) how the districts compare to traditional districting criteria, (3) how the majority party fares in the recent elections, and (4) possible explanations for election results other than efforts to obtain partisan political advantage. 101 The plurality approved of Justice Breyer's acknowledgement that the pursuit of partisan advantage can be constitu- tional, but they criticized his concept of unjustified entrenchment as a standard because of the uncertainty in its application. 102 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, agreed with both the plurality and the dissenters. He concurred with the plurality in their assertion that a judicially manageable standard to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims has yet to be presented, but he refrained from going so far as to say that partisan gerrymandering claims are categorically nonjusticiable. 103 Two main obstacles exist when courts are presented with partisan gerrymandering claims according to Justice Kennedy. "First is the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries." 104 He argued that the conclusion that partisan gerrymandering violates the law must be "more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied," it must be "that the classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective." 105 Second, there is an "absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention." 106 Justice Kennedy argued that before we can define a clear and manageable standard, there must be an agreement on the substantive principles of districting's fairness. 107 Rather than reach the conclusion of the plurality, that no judicially manageable standard has yet to emerge and, therefore, partisan gerrymandering claims should be outside the province of the judiciary, Justice Kennedy would have dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and would have held out hope for crafting a workable standard. 108
Vieth accomplished very little in the wake of Bandemer. The Court did set aside Bandemer because of its vague ruling and the difficulty in applying the high standard set by the Bandemer Court, but it did very little to resolve the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims. The plurality opinion held that partisan gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable; however, the lack of a clear consensus by the Court and the arrival of two new Justices, 109 leaves open the possibility that future partisan gerrymandering claims may succeed in the judicial system.
III. THE SITUATION IN TEXAS
A. The Political History of Texas "[T]he Democratic Party dominated the political landscape in Texas" from Reconstruction until the early 1960s. 110 In 1961, the first Republican since 1875 was elected to the Senate; in the 1960s and 1970s, the Republican Party never held more than four congressional seats, and their statewide voting strength hovered around thirty-five percent. 111 In 1978, even though the Republican Party reclaimed the Governor's Mansion for the first time in over one hundred years and had statewide voting strength at forty-three percent, Democrats won twenty of the twenty-four congressional seats. 112 In the 1980s, the Republican Party's strength grew, and by 1990 the Republican Party's statewide voting strength sat at forty-seven percent, merely four points lower than the Democratic Party's statewide voting strength. 113 The Democrats, however, still controlled nineteen congressional districts, compared to the Republicans' eight districts. 114 In 1991, the Democratically controlled Texas legislature enacted a new congressional district map resulting in the Democratic Party winning twenty-one congressional seats to the Republican Party's nine. 115 The Republicans continued to gain control over the statewide races, with their statewide voting strength even with that of the Democratic Party. 116 challenged the 1991 congressional district map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under Bandemer, but the district court denied relief and upheld the 1991 map. 117 In the 1992 elections, the Democratic Party won twenty-one congressional seats, and the Republican Party won nine. 118 In the 1990s, the Republicans continued to dominate the statewide elections and won every one of Texas's elected statewide offices since 1994. 119 In 1997, the Republican Party took control of the Texas Senate, but it would be another six years before the Republican Party controlled both state legislatures and the Governor's mansion. 120
B. The 2001 Congressional Districting Process
After the 2000 federal decennial census, Texas received two additional seats in Congress, giving the state a total of thirtytwo. 121 The Texas legislature, in 2001, received the task of replacing the previous thirty districts with thirty-two new, equipopulous districts. 122 The Balderas court realized that federal courts have a limited role in creating a congressional redistricting and that "'a court must defer to legislative judgments on reapportionment as much as possible;'" 128 however, in the given situation, the court "'is forbidden to [defer] when the legislative plan would not meet the special standards of population equality and racial fairness that are applicable to court-ordered plans.'" 129 In drawing the map, the district court started with a blank map and applied "'neutral districting factors'" that include compactness, contiguity, and respect for county and municipal boundaries. 130 the constituents were split up and placed into five different, predominantly non-Latino, white districts. 152 The Republican incumbent, Representative Henry Bonilla in District 23, narrowly won the 2002 election, and the new 2003 map ensured his safety in being re-elected by moving 100,000 Latino voters and replacing them with non-Latino, white and Republican voters. 153 To change the voter make-up of District 23, the legislature drew a new district that stretched from the Mexican border to Austin, called District 25. 154 Stretching three hundred miles long, it joined two densely populated areas, one in Austin and one in the Rio Grande Valley, by a narrow stretch of land that is only ten miles wide in some areas. 155 The new map was predicted to give Republicans at least twenty-one solid congressional districts out of thirty-two districts, and that prediction came true in the 2004 elections when Republicans won twenty-one seats with very few close competitions in the districts. 156 In the cases before the remand to the district court, the State of Texas admitted, and the three-judge court found as fact, that the sole motivation for changing the court-drawn map in 2003 was to increase the number of seats held by Republicans and diminish the number of seats held by Democrats. 163 On remand, the district court did not retract its previous finding of partisan motivation but instead concluded that it is a constitutionally permissible exercise of government power to create a redistricting map that appeals solely to partisan motivations. 164 . "There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage." Id. at 470. "'[T]he newly dominant Republicans . . . decided to redraw the state's congressional districts solely for the purpose of seizing between five and seven seats from Democratic incumbents.'" Id. at 472 (citation omitted). "Former Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff, one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate and commonly referred to as the conscience of the Senate, testified that political gain for the Republicans was 110% of the motivation for the Plan, that it was 'the entire motivation.'" Id. at 472-73. But see State Appellees' Brief, supra note 11, at 28-29 (arguing that while partisan gain was a motivating factor, it was only one of many factors influencing the 2002 redistricting process 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS
The Texas Redistricting Cases introduce several new issues not previously presented to the Court. Unlike Vieth and Bandemer, the redistricting of Texas took place mid-decade and not as the result of the decennial census and the constitutional need to reapportion the congressional districts. 166 The State of Texas had a valid and workable congressional district map in place that would have sufficed until the next decennial census in 2010; the state had no constitutional obligation to reapportion their districts in 2003. 167 It is also established that the redistricting took place for no other reason than to secure a greater partisan advantage in upcoming elections. 168 The 2001 congressional district map, however, was created by the federal court 169 and not by the state legislature, to whom the Constitution vests the power to determine district boundaries. 170 The inability of the state legislature to alter the judicially created map until 2010 infringes upon that power. Additionally, none of the appellants propose a new test or standard for the courts to implement when adjudicating partisan gerrymandering. 171 Without a way to measure future partisan gerrymandering, the Court will remain in the quagmire surrounding Bandemer and Vieth. Finally, there is the concern that, if the Court upholds Plan 1374C, then voters will lose their power to determine their representatives to political parties.
A. One-Person, One-Vote Requirement of the Constitution
Under the one-person, one-vote rule established by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Court has consistently held that congressional districts must have equal populations; otherwise, they are unconstitutional. 172 Realizing that population shifts oc- cur often and are almost impossible to track, 173 the Court has established the legal fiction, for apportionment purposes, that populations do not shift between districts between the decennial censuses. 174 The Court maintains that once a state has completed a new district map after the decennial census, that state may "operate under the legal fiction that even [ten] years later, the plans are constitutionally apportioned." 175 This legal fiction satisfies the practical concern that constant redistricting would be an impossible task for the state to manage and simultaneously creates a workable time frame for the states to readjust their districts. 176 The constitutional equal population standard tolerates only "population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality." 177 Between the 2000 census and 2003, the population in Texas increased from 20,851,820 to 22,118,509, an increase of almost 1.5 million. 178 When the Texas legislature enacted Plan 1374C, it used the outdated census data from 2000 in violation of Karcher v. Daggett. 179 The rule in Karcher permits only limited departures from inequality in congressional redistricting maps and only if those departures are unavoidable after a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality. 180 The state made no effort, much less the good faith effort required by Karcher, to achieve equality, and the appellants argue that absolute equality was achievable because the state already had a constitutionally legitimate plan in effect until 2010. 181 The state had two options to satisfy the oneperson, one-vote rule: the state could have used updated census numbers that had been collected with substantial technical precision, 182 or the state could have demonstrated that the deviations UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1193 from the equality requirement were for a legitimate goal. 183 These limitations effectively prevent a state from using outdated numbers without offering a reason or justification for their use. 184 The appellants in Travis County argued that the use of the 2000 census is not a constitutional defense to the strict one-person, onevote requirement and to allow the state to apply the inter-censal legal fiction in this manner "would be a perversion of the very reason the fiction was created." 185
The state defended its use of the outdated numbers, arguing that under the inter-censal legal fiction, the 2000 census numbers were still valid. 186 Additionally, the Travis County appellants did not provide an alternative district map based upon the current population data that would satisfy Karcher. 187 Arguing that a limited time frame prevented such a study from being done, 188 they relied upon the 2001 map as being a constitutionally sufficient map under the Karcher standards rather than providing an updated map. 189 The federal government, however, provides a middecade census mechanism for state governments under 13 U.S.C. § 196. 190 This statute allows for states to commission the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a mid-decade census, and the results of that census will be designated as "Official Census Statistics" and used in "the manner provided by applicable law. The appellants maintain that permitting the state to use the legal fiction to uphold a factually malapportioned plan diminishes the goal of the one-person, one-vote requirement. 192 As argued in their jurisdictional statement, It is one thing to indulge a legal fiction such as the one in question here when it is necessary to force legislative action, while still giving a solid reference point to meet the constitutional rule and minimize partisan manipulation. It is quite another thing to indulge the fiction to permit legislative action to meet the constitutional rule when the overweening aim of the action is partisan manipulation. 193 The one-person, one-vote requirement is a check upon a redistricting plan to limit partisan motivations. 194 To permit a state legislature, when creating a district map, to use inaccurate census numbers allows the state legislature to bypass the oneperson, one-vote requirement. 195 State legislatures could ignore significant population shifts that might be detrimental to their political party. 196 This legal fiction is further perverted by the state's use of the 2002 election results and its political trends together with the outdated census data. The state used the 2002 election results to spot political trends and to redraw the district lines in 2003. 197 District 23 provides the best example of this inconsistency. Based upon the election results of the 2002 election in which Representative Bonilla won a close race and only garnered eight percent of the Latino vote in the majority-Latino district, the mapmakers decided to redraw the district, using the 2000 census numbers, and remove a significant portion of the Latino community to ensure his re-election. 198 Although it is understood that election trends from previous elections may be used in the redrawing of a decennial congressional district map, those election trends are as up-to-date as the decennial census numbers being used. For example, when a state redraws its map after the 2000 election, it is UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1193 conceivable that the state would use the information from that election as well as the information from the 2000 census to draw the map. The Travis County appellants argue in their jurisdictional statement, When new lines are drawn after the census but before the first election following it, all the many factors impinging on where lines should be drawn-equal population, avoiding racial gerrymanders, Voting Rights Act requirements, and above all, politics-must be considered at the same time. . . . In this way, there is an interlocking web of checks on unbridled partisanship. 199 Allowing a state to use outdated census data but current political trend information from a recent election undermines the intent of the one-person, one vote requirement.
B. Pure Partisan Motivation
The Supreme Court in Vieth struggled with a case of partisan gerrymandering in Pennsylvania that occurred when there was a need for a new district map after the 2000 census. 200 The state of Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats and had to reapportion the districts to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement. 201 Although partisan motivations played a significant role in how the districts were carved up, 202 the new map served a legitimate government purpose: to ensure that the districts adhered to the strict one-person, one-vote requirement in Article I, Section 2. This is not true in Texas, where the mid-decade redistricting map served no purpose other than partisan manipulation. While the State argues other factors were considered in creating the 2003 map, the underlying motivation was to increase the number of Republican congressional districts within the state. 203 Much of the Court's struggle in Vieth rose from the complication of the constitutional requirement that Pennsylvania needed a new congressional district map. The Texas Redistricting Cases lack that additional factor and present the Court with a unique situation in which a state, with a valid, constitutionally-sufficient district map in place, decided to create a new map solely to bolster partisan control over the state.
The district court, in deciding the Texas Redistricting Cases, interpreted Vieth as rejecting the argument that proof of political motivations as the sole reason behind the new map is insufficient to invalidate a district or district map. 204 The complaint in Vieth alleged that some of the district lines drawn in Pennsylvania were the result of pure partisan motivation in their argument before the Supreme Court, however, appellants advocated for that map to be invalidated because it was drawn with a predominantly partisan intent that would create a Republican bias in future elections. 205 The test proposed by appellants in Vieth would determine unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering based upon whether "'the mapmakers acted with a predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage.'" 206 The plurality, joined by Justice Kennedy, rejected this test based upon predominant intent, because it would be too difficult for a court to effectively execute. 207 Vieth did not offer any clear guidance for a map drawn solely for political reasons that does not serve any legitimate government purpose. 208 The Equal Protection Clause, under the rational-basis standard, prohibits government use of power "solely to augment the influence of those with a favored political agenda at the expense of those who disagree with them." 209 The Supreme Court has consistently held that "'the concept of equal justice under the law requires the State to govern impartially'" and has forbid states from "'draw[ing] distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.'" 210 In his concurring opinion in Vieth, Justice Kennedy re-UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1193 turned to the equal protection rationale stated in Baker v. Carr: "'Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine . . . that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.'" 211 It is understandable that Justice Kennedy found no equal protection violation in Vieth because under the rationalbasis standard, the district map was not solely arbitrary and capricious because it served the legitimate function of reapportioning the malapportioned districts. Under the equal protection rational-basis standard, however, Plan 1374C is arbitrary and capricious because it reflects no policy or legitimate governmental purpose, only partisan motivations.
The Supreme Court can nullify Plan 1374C under the Equal Protection Clause in Jackson v. Perry without detracting from its holding that decennial census maps drawn with partisan motivations are not invalid. The concern expressed in Vieth about the lack of a judicially manageable standard is valid, but the Texas Redistricting Cases are limited to mid-decade redistricting for the sole purpose of partisan manipulation when a constitutionally legitimate map is in place. These cases may be the starting point for developing a judicially manageable standard under the Equal Protection Clause for treating partisan gerrymandering by preventing states from redistricting mid-decade purely for partisan gain.
States should be prevented from creating new districting maps mid-decade when they have a legal plan in place and their only goal and intent is partisan. District maps that are created as a result of the decennial census would not be affected by this ruling, and preventing mid-decade redistricting would not create a flood of partisan gerrymandering cases for courts to adjudicate. The new standard would be a bright-line rule for lower courts to follow, simply having to ask two questions: (1) was there already a constitutionally valid district map in place, and if so, (2) is there some legitimate, governmental purpose other than partisan motivation for the creation of this mid-decade plan? If the answer is no to the second question, the district map should be nullified. It may be difficult in future cases to determine whether the motivation behind the map was "solely partisan," and without a clear standard, courts would be forced to determine the legislative intent behind the redistricting process. The appellants did not offer a new test for courts to utilize in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering and instead relied upon the idea of pure partisan intent. 212 Without a clear understanding of what constitutes a legitimate government purpose, what constitutes partisan motivation beyond the situation in Texas, and how to evaluate the two concepts, the federal courts will be no better off than before when it comes to adjudicating partisan gerrymandering. The partisan gerrymandering may seem unfair, but as Justice Scalia noted in Vieth, fairness is not a judicially manageable standard. 213
C. Public Policy Concerns
There are serious policy concerns if the Court fails to limit certain types of partisan gerrymandering. In Vieth, Justice Kennedy noted that "one has the sense that legislative restraint was abandoned." 214 In the redistricting in Texas, however, it is clear that legislative restraint was abandoned, and if the Court approves of the actions of the Texas legislature, all legislative restraint may be abandoned in the future when states have to create new district maps. States would create maps after the decennial census, and, if unsatisfied with their political gain, they would be able to redistrict to improve their chances in the next election. Middecade redistricting would also occur every time a new political party secures majority power in a state and wants to retain that power as long as possible. Representatives and Senators would no longer be beholden to their constituents, but rather to their political parties to ensure their re-election. The most noticeable example of this situation occurred in District 23 when Representative Bonilla had a tight race in 2002. 215 To ensure his re-election, the state manipulated the district, removing 100,000 Latino voters and replacing them with Republican voters. 216 litical party to assist him in getting re-elected, rather than listening to the voice of the people who originally elected him.
There is also the risk of voting dilution where the weight of the voter who votes for the majority party has more stability and power than the voter who votes against the majority party. If voters in a district start to become disenchanted with their elected representative, the state, in an effort to ensure the incumbent's re-election, can shift the voters around to cure this problem. The votes of an electorate suddenly take on different weight, with those voting for the incumbent suddenly becoming more powerful than those voting against the incumbent.
In a nation where voter disenfranchisement is a growing concern and forty percent of the voting electorate failed to turn out for the 2004 presidential election, 217 judicial support of middecade partisan redistricting would do little to cure that dilemma. This problem will only increase once voters realize that voting against the majority party's power is futile because the state will simply reapportion the population to suit the majority party's needs. A Supreme Court ruling condoning this type of behavior cripples the democratic process and pushes partisan concerns above those of the electorate.
There are also serious implications if the Court finds that middecade redistricting for partisan gain is unconstitutional. States could be trapped within a constitutionally legitimate but politically unfair district map for ten years without any recourse. In a situation such as the Texas Redistricting Cases, where the 2001 map was created by the judiciary and not by the state legislatures, states would be prevented from curing any possible defects for ten years. The Constitution clearly makes congressional districting the province of the state legislatures, 218 and the judiciary only receives the task in extreme situations such as in Texas, when the legislature fails to update their congressional map. When federal courts create district maps, they are performing the duty of the state legislature, and the results may not always coincide with the legislature's goals, partisan or not. 219 It is always dangerous when a political branch ventures into another's territory, and failing to provide the state legislatures with a remedy from that intrusion could be perilous. If a state legislature does not have the ability to change a district map created by a court until the end of the decade, then that distorts the intent of the Framers in enacting Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The struggle in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases is most palpable in the Court's decisions in Bandemer and Vieth. 220 Finding a judicially manageable standard for courts to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering cases is a daunting task that many think is not possible, 221 and there is ample evidence to support that claim. 222 The Court, however, has yet to decide clearly that partisan gerrymandering claims fall within the political question doctrine and are, therefore, nonjusticiable. Recognizing the problems in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases, Justice Kennedy "would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases." 223 The Texas Redistricting Cases might be one situation in which judicial relief is possible, particularly because of its limited effect on partisan gerrymandering.
Granting judicial relief in the partisan claims brought forth by appellants in the Texas Redistricting Cases would create a definitive line separating blatant and flagrant partisan gerrymandering that serves no legitimate governmental purpose from partisan gerrymandering that is intertwined with a legitimate governmen- tal purpose. Failing to provide judicial relief to the partisan claims would permit egregious partisan manipulation of district lines and further alienate voters from their representatives. It is precisely the narrow circumstances of this case that show that partisan gerrymandering claims can be adjudicated, albeit only in certain, confined circumstances. But these cases may not necessarily provide a workable solution for the future and only solve the case at hand. The lack of a workable test to adjudicate future partisan gerrymandering could leave the Court with the only option of finding partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable. If the Court were to simply dismiss the claim as they did in Vieth, it would effectively render partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable, and it is unlikely that the Court would entertain future cases involving partisan gerrymandering.
Redistricting will always be influenced by politics, but it should not be allowed to be totally controlled by them. As Justice Breyer stated in his dissenting opinion in Vieth,
The use of purely political considerations in drawing district boundaries is not a "necessary evil" that, for lack of judicially manageable standards, the Constitution inevitably must tolerate. Rather, pure politics often helps to secure constitutionally important democratic objectives. But sometimes it does not. Sometimes purely political "gerrymandering" will fail to advance any plausible democratic objective while simultaneously threatening serious democratic harm. 224 Democracy is founded upon the belief that the people should elect their representatives. In a country so large and complicated, the election process subsequently becomes complicated. While political parties dominate elections, they do serve valuable purposes, and politics should be a factor to consider when drawing district maps. Politics, however, should not control that process. The fear that the people will lose power to the political parties is palpable in this day and age; the issue the Supreme Court needs to decide is whether the courts should police politics or leave it to the legislatures. 
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